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1. Introduction 29 
This article draws on the central themes of this Special Issue to explore the impact of Brexit on EU Development Policy, 30 
with a specific focus on EU-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) relations. Drawing on a materialist political economy 31 
approach, the core argument highlights the need to understand EU development relations within its broader context, 32 
both in terms of colonial and post-colonial structures and the expansion of the world market. It follows Rosamond’s 33 
(2016, p. 869) entreaty to study the EU within, rather than isolation from, the broader dynamics of political economy in 34 
which it is situated.  35 
Development policy provides a fruitful field in which to explore the impact of Brexit. It necessarily entails the analysis of 36 
both the internal and external dimensions of European integration/disintegration. EU development policy is an example 37 
of an area of mixed competences between the EU institutions and member states, which has experienced increasing 38 
Europeanisation whilst also being greatly influenced by the UK, in terms of funding, policy leadership, expertise and 39 
geographical orientation. A specific focus on the EU-ACP relationship provides evidence of these themes, and particularly 40 
the legacies of colonialism and pressures of ongoing neoliberal restructuring. In particular the current renegotiation of 41 
the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement provides a useful early test of such impacts on EU development policy, as it has coincided 42 
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both with preparations for Brexit and internal EU budgetary negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework 43 
(MFF). As such it reveals the anticipatory adjustments made by key actors in preparation for the departure of the UK, 44 
most notably EU Member states, EU and ACP institutional actors, and associated political and societal interests.  45 
Existing literature on the impact of Brexit on EU development policy has tended to focus on static impacts, particularly in 46 
relation to the funding and policy leadership gaps left by the UK’s exit. In these terms static impacts refer to the assumed 47 
effects on development policy and policy making of simply removing the UK from the ‘EU equation’ (De Ville and Siles-48 
Brügge 2019, Jensen and Snaith, 2018). This article explores this by demonstrating how the Commission and certain 49 
member states are utilising the confluence of the renegotiation of the EU-ACP relationship, the Multiannual Financial 50 
Framework and the removal of the UK from this area of policy making, to enhance the Commission’s role in the 51 
management of development policy. As the UK has historically opposed this integrative pressure, Brexit has provided 52 
opportunity to reignite this agenda.  53 
Whilst recognising the importance of the institutional challenges and changes provoked by Brexit, this article however 54 
argues for a broader analysis which highlights the more fundamental shifts that are reflective and constitutive of 55 
disintegration. It points to the anticipatory adjustments already underway in EU development policy that indicate its 56 
dynamic effects, for example the changing preferences and strategies in relation to the geographical and sectoral focus 57 
of development policy. Further evidence of such dynamism is the promotion of interests clearly aligned to EU self-58 
interest, defined both as the promotion of EU core policy concerns linked to development, particularly around security 59 
and control of migration, and in the material interests in promoting business expansion and the development of markets 60 
associated and linked to European capital. The article argues that this is represented by the discursive dynamics that 61 
explicitly justify the use of development cooperation in self-interested terms. In doing so it reveals the discursive and 62 
material struggles emerging as the EU seeks to reframe and promote its own interests alongside UK attempts to 63 
reconfigure itself as Global Britain, and throws light on the impact of disintegration on the global role of the EU and its 64 
future relations with the UK. Importantly it asserts that that the pursuit of key material and ideational interests in the 65 
external relations of the EU and its member states is not new, but is reliant on and reproduces inequitable historic and 66 
social conditions that structure contemporary North-South relations.  67 
This argument acknowledges the intertwined relationship between ideas, discourse and their material underpinnings. 68 
There is a substantial focus on discourse in materialist research approaches.  For example, in Gramscian terms, ideas 69 
combined with institutional forms and material capabilities, are central to hegemony and dominant social formations. 70 
Marx and Engels highlighted how class rule shapes the ruling ideas of each age, and forewarned against their presentation 71 
as being in the universal interest (Marx and Engels, 1974). Ideas and discourse are therefore powerful in both reproducing 72 
class relations and concealing their contradictions. The policy discourses within development relationships frequently 73 
contain, obscure and further particular material interests, which are presented as if they are of wider benefit. In 74 
contemporary development policy, discourse serves to obscure long-running inequalities associated with the continuing 75 
legacies of colonialism as well as more immediate aspects of the desires of different blocs (including national blocs) of 76 
capital for particular forms of investment and trade flows. This has implications for intra-capitalist competition, for the 77 
unequal relationship between capital and labour and a host of other unequal resource and power relations on the basis 78 
of gender, nationality and race. Policy discourse and its critical deconstruction then, is of central importance for 79 
materialist scholars who seek to answer the crucial question of ‘who benefits?’.  80 
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In order to explore these debates the article first locates the analysis of EU development policy within a political economy 81 
framework, in order to properly locate the analysis of Brexit within the context of crisis and associated pressures of the 82 
expansion of global markets. It then explores the relevance of the EU-ACP relationship to the study of both EU 83 
development policy and more broadly the processes of EU integration, by highlighting reform of the relationship from a 84 
neo-colonial to neo-liberal framework and the agency of the UK within that. In doing so it draws attention to the scalar 85 
significance of the relationship, which links 107 states and over 1.5 billion people across the world through its trade and 86 
aid provisions. It also highlights the importance of this particular conjuncture in which the renegotiation of the 87 
relationship has coincided with both the EU’s internal processes of reordering its future financial mechanisms and the 88 
disintegrative forces of Brexit. By understanding the particular contemporary context in which the EU-ACP relationship is 89 
located, we are better able to assess the likely impacts of the collision of these forces. In doing so the article explores 90 
current debates about the impact of Brexit on development policy in terms with their preoccupation with static impacts. 91 
This section focuses on both the internal funding and policy leadership gaps created through Brexit and opportunistic 92 
attempts to increase the role and power of the EU institutions in response. In contrast Section 5 develops the analysis of 93 
the dynamic impacts of Brexit through a focus on the anticipatory adjustments evident in the current renegotiation of 94 
the EU-ACP relationship and the changing geographical and sectoral focus of EU development policy. By exploring the 95 
framing of a post-Brexit EU development policy as the securing EU self-interest in the context of Brexit, the article argues 96 
that the disintegrative moment of the UK’s decision to leave the EU has provided an opportunity for the EU to readjust 97 
its external focus and influence to the exigencies of a changing and increasingly competitive global economy.  98 
2. The Political Economy of EU Development Policy  99 
Colonialism is deep in the DNA of EU development policy. As Nicolaïdis (2015, pp. 285-296) argues European amnesia 100 
allows this colonial legacy to be overlooked in the framings of current forms of development cooperation relations, 101 
permitting the EU to distance itself from its past whilst also seeking to secure continuity and collective management of a 102 
colonial world slipping out of the grasp of its individual member states. Development policy has been a key mechanism 103 
by which the EU has maintained existing patterns of production and exchange, albeit within a broader commitment to a 104 
multi-scalar neo-liberalisation. As such policy commitments to global frameworks of sustainability and poverty reduction, 105 
as embodied in the Sustainable Development Goals and the Post-2015 consensus, are combined with mechanisms that 106 
seek to manage processes of world market expansion and generalised competitiveness within state-society complexes 107 
throughout the Global South, and simultaneously within the EU itself (Price and Nunn 2016, p. 454). This is pursued 108 
internally through the broadening and deepening of its internal market, and externally through trade liberalisation and 109 
development cooperation relations, exposing labour and capital both within the EU and in its partners to increased 110 
competition (Price and Nunn 2016, p. 462). That this produces polarising and uneven effects is recognised by the EU and 111 
so it provides specific development policy mechanisms, such as Aid for Trade, to offset the damaging effects of neo-112 
liberalisation.  113 
A measure of the importance of this policy domain to the EU’s attempts to position itself within a changing global 114 
economy has been the ongoing attempts to increase supranational competence within the design and management of 115 
EU development policy. Since the turn of the new millennium there has been a range of initiatives to embed a European 116 
development policy both centrally and within the member states’ own policy frameworks. The EU believes that the 117 
collectivisation of development policy strengthens its global actorness and provides “added value, in terms of political 118 
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and financial leverage, that is larger than the sum of individual Member State actions” (European Commission and the 119 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016a, p.2). While Orbie and Carbone (2015) 120 
point to the limited provision by way of a formal acquis communautaire that bind member states in this area, the 2005 121 
European Consensus on Development and 2011 Agenda for Change stand out in setting common principles and practices, 122 
accompanied by specific institutions and budgetary instruments through which European development policy is 123 
managed. Delputte, Lannoo, Orbie, and Verschaeve (2019) state that while the EU has had an ‘outspoken commitment’ 124 
to both influencing its member states’ policies and fostering an enhanced European development policy, pressures for 125 
increased Europeanisation have been countered by the endurance of differing member state preferences and national 126 
priorities, the relatively weak institutional mechanisms that underpin the EU approach to development and sub- 127 
groupings of states that share differing ideas and priorities. However rather than viewing these as competing binary 128 
distinctions between the national and supranational characteristics, authors such as Smith (2016, p. 141) argue that the 129 
processes of (re)nationalisations, Europeanisation and globalisation occur in complex co-existence, with the interplay of 130 
structures, norms and practices at a variety of scales underpinning the shape and operation of EU development policy. 131 
An empirical focus on the EU-ACP relationship provides a lens through which to both understand this complexity and the 132 
potential effects Brexit will produce.   133 
3. The EU-ACP Relationship  134 
The EU-ACP relationship is rooted in the colonial past of EU member states, and reflects attempts to secure continuity 135 
and collective management of colonies and former colonies within the context of both the wide-ranging transitions to 136 
independence across the Global South and deepening and the widening of European integration. Originally signed in 137 
1975, in the wake of UK accession, the EU-ACP Partnership built on the 1957 Treaty of Rome and subsequent Yaoundé 138 
Conventions (1964 – 1975) which provided for the association of the colonial and post-colonial relations of the original 139 
six EEC member states. On the accession of the UK, these agreements were reformulated into the Lomé Conventions to 140 
accommodate the UK’s external relations, particularly its colonies and former colonies in the Caribbean and Anglophone 141 
Africa, with the ACP created as a group of states to ‘partner ’and negotiate with the EU. The UK was therefore central to 142 
the creation EU-ACP partnership, and has subsequently been a key actor in the ongoing reform of that relationship.  143 
The first Lomé Convention reflected broader global initiatives to address structural inequalities in the Global Economy, 144 
as embodied in the United Nations New International Economic Order (NIEO). This included developmental provisions, 145 
in particular non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements and commodity stabilization mechanisms. Development 146 
assistance was provided through the bespoke European Development Fund (EDF) and was not linked to the forms of 147 
economic and political conditionalities that would later define EU aid provision. The EDF has endured as the key EU-ACP 148 
aid funding mechanism, sitting outside the European budget and funded directly by member state contributions.  149 
The scale and scope of this relationship has changed over time, not least with the widening of both groups to now 150 
encompass 79 ACP states, 28 EU member states and 1.5 billion people. It has undergone continued pressures to liberalise 151 
culminating in the replacement of the Lomé Conventions by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000. This 152 
restructuring has locked-in longstanding commitments to neo-liberal reform, based on regionalisation and the 153 
restructuring of state-society relationships across the ACP. Non-reciprocal trade preferences were replaced by Free Trade 154 
Agreements, known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), between the EU and ACP regional groupings. Aid 155 
provision transformed from ‘project’ to ‘programmed aid’ and became increasingly conditional on structural adjustment 156 
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commitments, good governance, respect for human rights, democracy and transparency. A specific focus was placed on 157 
Aid for Trade (AfT) and Private Sector Development (PSD), with the EU providing 22.5 billion in AfT between 2005 and 158 
2013 (EC & HRUFASP 2016b, p. 61). This emphasis on the provision of funding to support trade reform and economic 159 
restructuring evidences the EU’s concern to offset the negative impacts of neo-liberalisation.  160 
In spite of a rhetorical commitment to trade liberalisation as a route to poverty reduction and economic development, 161 
this has had limited impact on pre-existing colonial patterns of trade. Trade diversification, industrialisation strategies 162 
and private sector development has been limited (EC & HRUFASP 2016b, p. 59). The EU remains a major trading partner 163 
for the ACP (accounting for 24% of their imports and 17% of their exports), and while the ACP as a block has maintained 164 
a trade surplus with the EU this is due to the predominance of African mineral exports (EC & HRUFASP 2016b, p.58). ACP 165 
agricultural trade remains dependent on primary commodities with little increase in processed, value added products, 166 
while the ACP trade surplus fell from EUR5 billion to EUR 3 Billion between 2004 and 2014 (EC & HRUFASP 2016b, p. 59). 167 
With the current Cotonou Agreement due to conclude in 2020, the EU undertook an extensive evaluation exercise which 168 
revealed the limited impact that the Cotonou Agreement has had on poverty reduction, inequality and growth 169 
distribution (EC & HRUFASP 2016b, p. 93). There has been limited success in the promotion of inclusive growth, in 170 
increasing the level of economic participation of the poor and in tackling the root causes of conflict (EC & HRUFASP 2016b, 171 
p. 120). Moreover, civil society actors, NGOs and domestic ACP businesses have coalesced in anti-EPA movements, 172 
recognising the threat posed to their economies from the unrestrained access of large-scale EU enterprises to their 173 
markets. While domestic resistance has limited progress on the EPA agenda, the EU has continued to press for the 174 
liberalisation of ACP economies.  175 
The contestations arising from the outcomes and effects of EU development policy have not dampened the commitment 176 
of either the EU or the ACP to negotiate a successor to the Cotonou Agreement after its expiry in 2020. From an 177 
institutional perspective, the EU regards the Cotonou Agreement as providing particular value as a single, predictable, 178 
long-term, legally-binding framework with underlying values and principles and a wide-range of instruments, which is 179 
ratified by all ACP countries and allows critical mass in financial resources (EC & HRUFASP 2016b, p. 132). This has driven 180 
the EU’s ongoing commitment to the agreement and its replacement. The post -Cotonou negotiations were begun in 181 
2018, but it could not have been foreseen when the original agreement was signed in 2000, that these would be 182 
conducted in the context of the UK’s decision to leave the EU and in conditions of such uncertainty.  183 
4. Exploring the Static Impacts of Brexit  184 
Existing literature on the impact of Brexit on EU Development Policy has tended to focus on static effects by scenario 185 
planning the effect of removing the UK from the “EU equation” (Jensen and Snaith, 2018).  Such analyses rely on 186 
understandings of EU’s policy-making machinery based on its past behaviour (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2019)  and 187 
reflects the tendency of neo-functionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism to imagine the EU as “institutionally 188 
resilient”, and of institutionalist approaches to emphasise the “‘stickiness’ of institutional equilibria” (Rosamond 2016, p. 189 
866). In this vein, Henökl (2018, p. 64) builds a new institutionalist analysis which highlights the challenges Brexit poses 190 
for EU development policy, including existing legal obligations, budget shortfalls, securing business continuity, policy 191 
realignment, and representation and membership of international fora. Drawing on an analysis of differentiated 192 
integration and regional disintegration, possible scenarios are outlined for post-Brexit EU-UK cooperation which could 193 
structure the future of EU development policy. These scenarios are either total rupture and disintegration; selective 194 
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involvement in some agreements; or strong UK engagement through engagement in existing relations (Henökl 2018, p. 195 
65). The sequenced nature of the Brexit negotiations which requires the approval of the Withdrawal Agreement before 196 
the future shape of the UK/EU relationship is agreed, means that at the time of writing this remains undefined. As such 197 
this process of disintegration has an unknown destination and a variety of different policy outcomes (De Ville and  Siles-198 
Brügge, 2019)   199 
This indeterminacy provokes scenario planning based on the UK’s central role in development policy and funding, and 200 
the manner in which UK’s colonial legacy, particularly its relations with the Commonwealth, have historically shaped this 201 
area of EU policy and condition future interests of both the EU and UK. Brexit therefore raises questions about the EU’s 202 
capacity to maintain coherence after losing the UK as a coordinator and policy innovator, and the future financing and 203 
shape of development cooperation. As such it brings a threat of instability in EU external relations and possibly an overall 204 
reduction in the EU’s significance as a global actor. However, opportunities have also been created for member states, 205 
institutional and societal actors and third countries to adapt their preferences and behaviour to the absence of the UK. 206 
An exploration of the specifities of the EU-ACP relationship in relation to gaps left by the removal of the UK throws some 207 
light on the analysis of the static, and more dynamic, impacts of Brexit.  208 
4.1 The Funding Gap:  209 
In material terms the loss of the UK contributions to EU development funding will pose a particular challenge for the 210 
remaining 27 Member States. The EDF has historically been reliant on UK funding, with it contributing €4.5 billion to the 211 
current 11th EDF. This constitutes approximately 15% of the total EDF, making the UK the third largest contributor (after 212 
Germany’s €6.28 billion, and France’s €5.43 billion) (EU Commission 2013, DFID 2013).  Due to the funding cycle, member 213 
states contributions to the 11th EDF were due in 2018, giving particular importance to the negotiation of the Withdrawal 214 
Agreement and the associated financial ‘divorce’ settlement, although there was little public discussion of the importance 215 
of ongoing aid commitments within this. The lack of provisions for a contributor to leave the EDF brought uncertainty, 216 
however in 2017 it was confirmed the UK would remain party to the Fund and maintain its existing modalities of payments 217 
until it left the EU, with the 2018 Withdrawal Agreement (articles 129 and 152) making explicit this commitment to 218 
Cotonou’s institutional structure and funding obligations (EU Commission 2017, UK Government 2018). This pragmatic 219 
solution represents path dependency and institutional binding resultant from the joint institutions and international legal 220 
basis of the Cotonou Agreement.  221 
In the context of Brexit and Cotonou’s legal agreement ending in 2020, the impact of the loss of UK funding is less certain, 222 
particularly given the declining aid commitments of the remaining 27 EU member states. Between 2010-2015 Belgium, 223 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain enacted 224 
cuts to their aid provision. While there have been some expectations that the remaining member states would 225 
compensate of the loss of UK funding, this is uncertain (Castillejo et al., 2018, p. 13). As the EDF has its own legal and 226 
institutional basis, it could operate as a ‘pan-European development fund’ (Olivie and Perez 2017, p. 34) giving the UK 227 
opportunity to continue to provide funds as a Third Party. The UK has signalled it is considering the potential for continued 228 
funding of EU development instruments, in return for an appropriate yet unspecified role in decision making (European 229 
Scrutiny Committee 2018). However, this is unlikely to be agreed while the negotiations for Brexit, the Multiannual 230 
Financial Framework and the successor to the Cotonou Agreement are ongoing.   231 
4.ii. The Policy Leadership Gap  232 
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Historically the UK has shown significant leadership in development policy making, with the Department for International 233 
Development (DFID) recognised as a leading development actor. Sherriff, Head of European External Action Programme 234 
argued that “the UK has had an influence on the EU’s focus and expertise on the 0.7% target for aid, the SDGs, the value 235 
for money and results agenda, differentiation in EU aid to focus more on least development countries and fragile states” 236 
(Laporte et al., 2016). The UK led innovations in the Cotonou Agreement, particularly the marriage of social policies with 237 
trade liberalisation. UK policy makers considered themselves ‘determinant actors’ in the allocation of EU aid to LDCs, the 238 
introduction of transparency as well as “result-orientation” in aid management and in raising awareness of gender issues 239 
(Olivie and Perez 2017, p. 21). Haastrup, Wright & Guerrina (2019) argued that the UK has consistently shown leadership 240 
in the integration of gender perspectives in development cooperation, to a greater extent than other EU member states 241 
or institutions.  242 
The UK proved adept at leveraging EU development provision to achieve DFID’s own objectives and national goals, and 243 
through the collectivisation of aid, operationalised its impact more extensively than it could have done through bilateral 244 
mechanisms (UK Government, 2013). DFID’s Multilateral Review (MAR) ranked the EDF 11 out of 43 multilateral 245 
organisations for ‘good value for money’. This analysis rested on its close alignment with DFID policy, its critical role in 246 
meeting international development objectives, and its capacity to extend the reach of UK aid to areas where the UK had 247 
a limited and declining aid presence, or where DFID did not operate (DFID 2013, Watkins 2016). Furthermore the UK 248 
played a strong coordinating role in the alignment of national, regional and global policy. The UK was at the forefront of 249 
coordinating EU policy with the MDGs, the SDGs and the post-2015 Agenda, forging partnerships with ‘like-minded’ states 250 
(e.g. Nordic States, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) to develop a collective approach that promoted a particular 251 
form of development and emphasising the benefits and efficiency of collective action (Watkins, 2016). Through such 252 
coalitions it played a leading role in the 2005 EU consensus on Development and built momentum for the legal basis for 253 
development policy in the Lisbon Treaty (Castillejo, et al., 2018, p.13), whilst also promoting own priorities at a global 254 
level. This underpins the findings of the Independent Commission on Aid Impact (2015) that DFID has significant influence 255 
in the multilateral system 256 
In the facilitation and coordination of consensus across various groupings, the UK acted as a pivotal outlier. Carbone 257 
(2012, p. 5) notes that achieving consensus between members states was difficult due to competing preferences. France 258 
and Belgium for example prioritised their former colonies while others (e.g. Italy, Greece and Central Europe) focussed 259 
on their immediate neighbours. While the UK played key roles within and between different EU coalitions, there have 260 
been questions about the extent to which it has maintained its centrality. There is evidence that the UK has become more 261 
of an ‘outlier’ across time. Sheriff stated that ‘EU development policy was in a state of evolution even before Brexit, 262 
moving to be more aligned with EU self-interest and the SDGs” (Laporte, Sherriff, Hauck, and Bilal, 2016). While others 263 
argue that there is a ‘strategic deficit’ in political leadership in development policy, they point to new coalitions and 264 
interests forming in response to the loss of the UK as a powerful development policy actor (Castillejo, et al., 2018, p. 13). 265 
Therefore rather than static responses to the policy leadership gap, this might be an early indication of more dynamic 266 
effects emerging.  267 
4.iii. EDF Reform and Increased ‘Europeanisation’  268 
Reform of the EDF provides a key test of the static impacts of Brexit. Historically the UK was opposed to Commission 269 
proposals to incorporate the EDF into the EU budget, fearing an increase of the Commission’s role and the loss of national 270 
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control. In contrast the Commission has been keen to establish itself as a ‘front runner’ in the SDGs and has sought to 271 
reposition itself by advocating for strong coordination mechanisms to monitor EU and Member states activities and the 272 
development of a ‘whole of government’ approach (European Commission 2019, p. 4,55). This gives weight to 273 
institutionalist accounts of Brexit being a critical juncture that gives rise to radical institutional change.  274 
 Commission attempts to augment its role in this moment of flux been met by a lack of consensus and opposition by some 275 
member states (Castillejo, et al., 2018, p. 10). While there is support for reforming the status quo, there is division over 276 
the shape that change should take (Castillejo et al., 2018, p. 10). As with the UK, France, Poland and Hungary have 277 
opposed to budgetisation, while Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Finland, have been supportive, 278 
regarding this as a move to harmonised and coherent external action (Castillejo, et al., 2018, p. 6-10). A further section 279 
of members states, broadly described as ‘more Eurosceptic’, want an overall reduction of the MFF, a reprioritisation of 280 
spending, and a focus on adding value (Castillejo, et al.,  2018, p. 6). 281 
In the context of the removal of the UK from the ‘EU equation’ the Commission has reinvigorated its proposals to 282 
budgetise the EDF and radically reform aid mechanisms as part of the 2021-2027 MFF. Alongside bringing the EDF firmly 283 
under the control of EU institutions, it has proposed an increase of 30% in its external action budget to €123 billion 284 
(European Commission, 2018b). The Commission argues that budgetisation will provide protection from the 285 
vulnerabilities of member states declining aid commitments and provide more coherence, greater transparency, 286 
democratic scrutiny and flexibility (European Commission, 2018b). The new proposals are based on the Neighbourhood, 287 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), merging a number of EU financing mechanisms onto a 288 
geographic pillar (with a focus on the neighbourhood and Sub-Saharan Africa), a thematic pillar and a rapid response 289 
pillar. In addition the proposals include an Investment Framework for External Action, with an increased ‘fire-power’ of 290 
up to €60 billion to help raise and leverage additional private sector financial resources (European Commission, 2018b).  291 
The Commission’s decision to utilise the confluence of Brexit, the renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement and the MFF 292 
to bring forward this reform demonstrates a degree of opportunism. Lightfoot, Mawdsley, and Svent-Ivanyi (2017) note 293 
that the Commission has long been ‘carving itself a role as coordinator of member state activities’, and has signalled its 294 
intentions to increase its capacity in this field. The opposition of the UK and other EU Member states has been matched 295 
the ACP who are concerned this could herald a diminution of its aid allocation. The ACP negotiating mandate for the post-296 
2020 relationship therefore makes explicit its firm preference for maintaining the EDF outside of the budget coupled with 297 
an emphasis on budget support (ACP 2018, p. 25). While the coalition of opposition led to the failure of the Commission’s 298 
previous attempts to budgetise the EDF, for example in 2003 in advance of the 10th EDF (European Commission, 2003), 299 
in the context of Brexit, it has renewed its proposals.  300 
Importantly the integration of the EDF into the budget would make it difficult for the UK to continue to participate in EU 301 
external relations. The principle of third-party participation in EU development mechanisms is already established 302 
through the financial innovations that allow non-member state to channel their ODA via the EU. The option of maintaining 303 
UK EDF funding is broadly in line with ACP preferences to open the post-Cotonou relationship to third parties. Indeed 304 
certain members states’ opposition to budgetisation reflects their desire to facilitate the continuation of the UK’s 305 
contribution (Castillejo et al., 2018, p. 10). The possibility of ongoing UK contributions to the EDF would limit the impact 306 
of Brexit on this area of development policy. However this prospect appears unlikely, not least due to the reduced 307 
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leadership capacity the UK would inevitably have as an ‘outside’ contributor, notwithstanding its demands to continue 308 
to shape policy in return for its participation. 309 
In light of the indeterminacy of the disintegrative processes, there has been a tendency to focus on scenario planning 310 
responses to the gaps left by the UK. Institutionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist accounts provide analyses of the 311 
extent to which the remaining EU states and institutions ‘fill the gap’ left by the UK in funding, policy leadership and 312 
policy orientation and/ or reshape EU development policy. Within this, the analysis of whether Brexit represents the kind 313 
of critical juncture that will induce radical change is key. However, it is perhaps more fruitful to understand this 314 
disintegration within a broader set of transformations associated with the expansion of the World Market and its inherent 315 
tendency to crisis. Here the analysis of the anticipatory adjustments and discursive framings evident in the EU-ACP 316 
relationship provide an alternate lens through which to assess the dynamic effects of Brexit.  317 
5.  Anticipatory Adjustments and the Discursive Dynamics in the EU-ACP Relationship  318 
The focus on the anticipatory adjustments in advance of Brexit speaks to Rosamond’s (2016, p. 868) analysis of 319 
disintegration as an indeterminate, messy and drawn out process mediated by the EU’s multi-institutional game. This 320 
uncertainty points to the way in which the effects of Brexit on EU development policy will depend on the adjustments 321 
made by both societal and institutional actors (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2019)  In terms of the EU-ACP relationship these 322 
anticipatory adjustments are increasingly apparent in the EU’s sectoral and geographic orientation and discursive 323 
dynamics.   324 
5. i: Reorientation of Geographical and Sectoral Focus  325 
Given the manner in which UK colonial relations have shaped EU external relations, Brexit could herald a redirection of 326 
the geographical focus of development policy, posing a particular threat for Commonwealth ACP states. Non-LDC states, 327 
such as those in the Caribbean, might experience a reduction in aid due to close links to the UK and the EU preference 328 
for a differentiated approach. Laporte (Laporte et al., 2016) suggested ‘it might be difficult for the English-speaking 329 
Caribbean to find new allies in Europe that will defend their case in Brussels’. Furthermore, the absence of the UK from 330 
the MFF negotiations could mean a greater focus by the EU on middle income countries (Castillejo et al., 2018). Olivie 331 
and Perez (2017) suggest that these potential impacts would be compounded by a changing sectoral focus away from 332 
social development to infrastructural development and trade facilitation.  333 
Early evidence of a changing geographical focus was clear in the EU’s proposal to replace the Cotonou Agreement with 334 
three distinct, differentiated regional partnerships within a common umbrella agreement. This would maintain the 335 
existing acquis without incurring significant financial costs (EC & HRUFASP 2016a, p. 3). These strengthened yet flexible 336 
regional partnerships (EU-Africa, EU- Caribbean and EU-Pacific) rely on an increased management role for associated 337 
regional organisations, and have a specific set of regional themes. For Africa, this includes a focus on migration and 338 
‘mobility management’, reflecting the EU’s growing concerns about immigration, security and the pressures facing the 339 
Southern EU member states. For the Caribbean, which was the first region to conclude an EPA through the CARIFORUM-340 
EU partnership, the specific focus is sustainability, climate change and natural disasters.  The EU’s relations with the 341 
Pacific share a similar set of priorities, highlighting the dependence of the region on maritime security and ocean 342 
governance. The Pacific Islands Forum has been identified as a key organisation in the future management of EU-Pacific 343 
relations, although without the basis of a region-wide EPA which has proved difficult to conclude and currently only 344 
includes Papua New Guinea and Fiji.  345 
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 While the EU’s preference for a more regionalised approach is longstanding, as evidenced in the EPA frameworks, this 346 
has been greatly strengthened through the Post-Cotonou proposals and the pursuit of the Continent to Continent (C2C) 347 
agreement to cement EU-African Union relations. The EU’s proposals chime with those of the African Union (AU) and its 348 
desire to ensure African Unity and augment EU-AU relations (African Union, 2018). This consensus produced the New 349 
Africa Europe Alliance and is reinforced by the EU’s support for African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which 350 
includes increases in financial support from EUR 7 million (2014-2017) to EUR 50 Million (2018-2020). The long-term aim 351 
is to build a continent-to-continent EU-ACFTA Agreement (European Commission, 2018a). The confluence of the 352 
preparations for the Post-Cotonou negotiations and for Brexit have therefore provided a unique opportunity for the EU 353 
to secure and deepen its regionalised approach to development, and particularly its relations with Africa as a bloc. Its 354 
ongoing commitment to principles of poverty reduction however is less certain.  355 
Other dynamic effects of Brexit might become evident through strengthened ACP negotiating power. While the collective 356 
ACP has remained committed to maintaining the integrity of the Group, Brexit presents an opportunity for individual 357 
states, regions and groups to leverage their position in relation to the EU (Langan, 2016). With the UK potentially offering 358 
an alternative set of trade relationships, ACP states could exact concessions from both sides in order to secure their 359 
interests. As such, Brexit could create dynamism in the behaviour of third countries, as they seize the opportunity to 360 
maximise their positions and gain concessions from the EU. This could signal a rebalancing of the historically asymmetrical 361 
EU-ACP relations and limit the EU’s power to push its own interests, either geographically or sectorally. The disintegrative 362 
momentum therefore could provide opportunity for the ACP to bring a more developmental focus to the relationship 363 
and offset the socio-economic pressures wrought through rapid trade liberalisation and associated neo-liberal 364 
restructuring. 365 
This potential shift towards more equitable relations has however been countered by the Commission’s explicit desire to 366 
pursue of its own preferences and self-interest within the new relationship. “The general objective is to shape relations 367 
with the ACP countries after 2020 as to best achieve the EU's interests” (EC & HRUFASP 2016a, p. 2). Furthermore the 368 
EU’s regionalised approach could facilitate the expansion of the EU’s external relations. The regional pillar approach 369 
provides the opportunity to extend the relationship beyond the existing ACP members, for example to include North 370 
African states, other non-ACP LDCs and small island developing states (EC & HRUFASP 2016a, p. 3). Therefore the post-371 
Cotonou agreement presents an opportunity to expand the global reach of the EU through and beyond existing 372 
frameworks, and in doing so poses a particular challenge to the global influence of the UK post-Brexit.  373 
In the context of the EU’s intentions to deepen and widen its links to Africa, the UK government has also been signalling 374 
its desire to its secure position on the continent. North Africa in particular is an emerging arena of competition. In pursuit 375 
of its post-Brexit Global Britain agenda, the UK is rapidly expanding its presence throughout the continent. Former French 376 
colonies, such as the rapidly growing frontier markets of Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal, have been identified as areas of 377 
interest, while new UK embassies have been established in Niger and Chad. However, while these competing positions 378 
indicate attempts to secure advantage in potentially lucrative emerging markets and zones of influence, both the UK and 379 
EU share common commitments to securing processes of world market expansion and embedding neoliberal reform 380 
(Price and Nunn 2016, p. 454). Moreover, the adoption and promotion of collectivised investment facilities at the heart 381 
of both EU and UK development funding provides opportunities for collaboration. The UK stated that cooperation based 382 
on the collective management of investments could be possible if the EU matched the UK’s agenda (Mordaunt 2018). 383 
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The extent to which this would depend on the City of London’s expertise, and the willingness of both the UK and EU to 384 
fund collective investments could determine the future shape of their cooperation.  385 
Both DFID and the Commission have enthusiastically supported and promoted collaborative financial Innovations such 386 
as aid blending, which combine funding from various public and private channels to generate further investment and 387 
leverage large-scale finance (EC & HRUFASP 2016b, p. 111). EU aid blending mechanisms such as delegated cooperation 388 
and trust funds, allow the participation of non-member states, for example Norway and Switzerland, and offer 389 
possibilities for future collaboration with a Post-Brexit UK. Member states and non-member states currently contribute 390 
to facilities either directly or through investment organisations. For example, PIDG, a key EU trust fund investor, is funded 391 
by UK aid in combination with the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Sweden, Germany and the International Finance 392 
Corporation (PIDG 2019). While blended aid mechanisms have expanded rapidly over the last decade, there has been a 393 
corresponding decline in budgetary support (EC & HRUFASP 2016c, p. 80-84). This shifting emphasis is in spite of the 394 
Commission’s evaluation which found that budget support had been most effective in reducing extreme poverty (EC & 395 
HRUFASP 2016b, p. 93).  396 
The current EDF incorporates 2 types of Trust Fund: The Emergency and Post Emergency Trust Fund and the Thematic 397 
Trust Funds. The Commission re-emphasised its support for such mechanisms in the recent New European Consensus of 398 
Development. Examples include the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust fund, The Caribbean Investment Facility, The 399 
Investment Facility for the Pacific, the Africa Investment Facility and the European Fund for Sustainable Development 400 
which provides investment guarantees from the EU budget to lower the risks of the expansion of investment (EC & 401 
HRUFASP 2016b, p. 111). These are augmented by policy innovations such as the 2018 Africa-European Alliance for 402 
Sustainable Investment and Jobs which aimed to de-risk investment and mobilise private sector financing in Africa 403 
(European Commission 2019, p. 49). 404 
Aid blending has become a key mechanism for the EU to deliver its interest driven development policy. While there has 405 
been the strong promotion and proliferation of these public/private finance innovations, Castillejo et al., (2018) argue 406 
that there has been a lack of associated mechanisms for reporting and scrutiny. Langan (2018, p. 76) has argued that 407 
these mechanisms represent the forms of ‘revolving credit’ highlighted in neo-colonialist critiques, in which aid is 408 
channelled into initiatives that offer opportunities for returns on capital for donor states and allied business interest, 409 
often producing negative consequences for labour and the environment and little by way of poverty reduction.   410 
4.ii.  The Discursive Dynamics of Brexit  411 
Long-running neo-colonial and dependency critiques have emphasised the material underpinnings of development 412 
policy. In its most recent incarnation however the framing of aid as an investment tool marks a novel discursive turn in 413 
which the donor self-interest motive is explicitly promoted and justified. This discourse, rooted in deep material interests, 414 
is represented in EU and UK development policy, in struggles to establish presence in areas that were commonly shared 415 
prior to Brexit, and in the assurances provided to domestic constituencies of the value of development cooperation. 416 
The ‘globalist discourse’ (Smith, 2019) of a resurgent Global Britain relies on the reformulation of development policy 417 
that closely aligns with the interests of the British state and business, as represented in the ‘Value for Money‘ mantra. 418 
This draws heavily on a discursive reinvigoration of the Commonwealth that conjures the notions of Empire and 419 
colonialism. Importantly this is framed within a ‘Myth of Betrayal’ (Murray Evans, 2016) that ignores the relationships 420 
the UK maintained with the Commonwealth through EU membership.  421 
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The UK’s willingness to express its desire to secure material interests through the discourse of Value for Money in 422 
development policy has been matched by the EU. Within the context of enduring effects of global financial crisis and the 423 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe, large-scale migratory pressures, challenges of rising populism and pressures 424 
on multilateralism, EU development policy has been shaped by the need to assure domestic constituencies that economic 425 
stability, migration and security threats are being addressed. The discursive framing of development cooperation 426 
emphasises its potential to deliver returns to Europe and secure the interests of its own citizens and businesses, over the 427 
normative commitment to poverty reduction or indeed any sense of post-colonial retributive justice. This framing is 428 
increasingly necessary in order to garner member state consensus over the future of EU development policy, particularly 429 
where domestic constituencies question policy and funding rationales. Castillejo et al., (2018, p. 6) state that in spite of 430 
elements of discord between member states and EU institutions, there is support for the promotion of EU interests, 431 
particularly when tied to the sustainable provision of global public goods. Within this, concepts such as ‘sustainable 432 
development’ and ‘poverty reduction’ act as important legitimating discourses. However while Brexit produces differing 433 
geo-economic imaginaries depending on the way in which ideas are articulated, the EU’s commitment to ongoing 434 
neoliberalisation is likely to be undisturbed by the Brexit (Adler-Nissen, Galpin and Rosamond 2016, p. 585-586), 435 
notwithstanding the driving role the UK has played within the policies and narratives that have structured its 436 
development policy.  437 
Conclusion  438 
Brexit has fundamental implications for the EU’s development policies. The loss of the UK will create gaps in funding and 439 
policy leadership, and could bring changes to the geographic and sectoral focus of existing relations. Anticipatory 440 
adjustments by leading member states, EU institutions and partners have demonstrated the extent to which the 441 
confluence of Brexit, the Multi-annual Financial Framework and the EU-ACP negotiations have provided opportunities 442 
for change. They also point to the challenges the EU faces in addressing its strategic deficit in policy making and in funding 443 
future development cooperation.  444 
While existing analyses offer insight into the institutional impacts of Brexit in terms of filling the gaps left by the UK, they 445 
tend to overlook the broader and more fundamental shifts which are both reflective and constitutive of disintegration. 446 
The relevance of a materialist political economy approach helps locate the impacts of Brexit within the context of crises 447 
and the pressures of the expansion of global markets. By pointing to the anticipatory adjustments being made in terms 448 
of a changing geographic and sectoral focus and the discursive turn in policy making towards self-interest and securing 449 
material interests, we are better able to understand both the impact of that Brexit will have on development cooperation 450 
and the EU-ACP relationship. Moreover it throws light on the impact of disintegration on the global role of the EU and its 451 
future relations with the UK. While there is a commonality in their commitment to neo-liberalisation and the expansion 452 
of global markets and private investment, the extent to which their own interests are articulated as national, regional or 453 
global will determine the future of their relationship. Importantly, Nicolaïdis (2015) reminds us that the pursuit of self-454 
interest and key material and ideational interests in the external relations of the EU and its member states is not novel, 455 
but relies on a collective amnesia about the historic and social conditions that fashion contemporary North-South 456 
relations and the asymmetries that underpin them. The extent to which Brexit will resolve these remains uncertain.  457 
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